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How economies of countries at war (war economies) transform in ‘peace’ is a critical 
new area of research in political economy and war and peace studies. The dynamics that 
affect the way war economies perpetuate or mutate after a peace agreement is signed is 
the context for this examination of non-state actor roles – normally attention is on state 
and international organisations – in the problems of peacebuilding. Here the focus is on 
diaspora networks, what might be described as national or transnational civil society 
groupings whose role is autonomous but carried considerable potential to assist 
reconstruction of the war-torn homeland. 
 
In examining the contribution of diaspora networks to the building of a political 
economy of peace this paper will connect with several discourses, both established and 
incipient, including diaspora studies, political economy of war literature and social 
network analysis. The aim here is to understand how networks function, and to 
interrogate their relationship with home- and hostlands and the wider diaspora in order 
to attempt an assessment of their contribution or prospects for a contribution to the 
processes of peacebuilding and reconstruction of war-torn societies. This paper examines 
three diaspora networks linked to societies formerly at war: Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina (Bosnia) and Sierra Leone. The work forms part of a major ESRC-funded 
ongoing research project into the transformation of war economies into economies of 
peace which focuses on these three cases. 
 
Defining Diasporas 
 
The assumption that diaspora actors can promote or enhance aspects of the homeland’s 
economic development is underpinned by a number of studies. Mohan and Zack-
Williams argue that ‘both politically and economically the diaspora has an important 
part to play in contemporary social processes’ (2002:211). The Chinese diaspora – 
somewhat unique - is thought to possess $1.5-2 trillion in liquid assets and has been the 
main investment engine in the homeland’s massive growth over the last two decades. 
These contributions emanate from business networks and individual business people’s 
investments. Other diaspora contributions to homeland development in the literature 
include tourism, the purchase of homeland products (often nostalgia-related), individual 
remittance (discussed below) and hometown association development assistance. 
 
The latter is of special relevance to this paper. Hometown associations (HAs) focus on a 
wide range of often infrastructure-building social service-related projects (Eekhoff defines 
four main areas: charity, infrastructure, human development, and fundraising (1997)). 
Infrastructural improvements are critical to future economic development. As Orozco 
found, HA donations often exceeded local budgetary allocations for public infrastructural 
works, particularly in towns with small populations (i.e., under 1000). HA participation 
has been documented across different diaspora groups: Mexicans in the U.S. may donate 
up to $30m p.a. in this way (usually less than $10,000 per association) and approaching 
100,000 Guyanese immigrants in the U.S. donated to an association (Orozco, 2003). 
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The transfer of funds (and sometimes goods) to the homeland – remittances - are another 
way individual actors assist development (through family or friends) back home. Gundel 
(2002) noted how such transfers were far more important ‘for livelihood and survival in 
Somalia than development and humanitarian aid put together’. In Somaliland research 
reached similar conclusions regarding the importance of remittances (Ahmed, 2002). 
Transfers were highly skewed however, with large sums favouring only a small 
proportion of households. Jazayery proposes that the number of Afghan refugees (mainly 
in Iran and Pakistan) who benefit from remittances is ‘probably in the low hundreds of 
thousands, a relatively small proportion of the total number of Afghan refugees’ 
(2002:242). Gundel suggests that, in being  critical to the civil war economy and in the 
post-war period, remittances, through the Hawilad system, have remained ‘the most 
important social safety net for most Somalis’, in effect that coping economies established 
during the war have perpetuated beyond the main period of conflict (2002:269-277). Such 
connections are relatively tangible and quantifiable including donations and remittances, 
capital investments and resources connected to other joint ventures either in homelands 
or in other states. In total, remittances may amount to over $500bn per annum (Van 
Hear, 1998; Sheffer, 2002). It has been suggested that established diasporas – e.g., Indian, 
Italian, Chinese, Greek - remit greater amounts than members of incipient diasporas such 
as the case studies countries examined in this study: Afghan, Bosnian and Sierra 
Leonean networks (Sheffer: 190).  
 
Re-examining the focus on diaspora support for recovery from war – the negative effects 
of diaspora, e.g., in promoting extreme nationalism and conflict notwithstanding – it is 
necessary at the theoretical level to distinguish clusters of migrants from diaspora 
communities.  An essential feature of the latter is the existence of an ongoing relationship 
with the homeland. A level of consciousness of being a diaspora, that is, being away from 
‘home’, being not entirely, or at all, at home in the hostland, is critical, too. Migrant 
clusters are not seen as having concern for the homeland, at least not beyond the level of 
lending assistance to individuals. Diaspora, not migrants as such, are the important focus 
therefore for political economy of peace research. Diaspora literature proposes many 
alternative definitions of what exactly a diaspora is. There is little agreement about 
whether a new migrant should be seen as a member of an existing diaspora or part of a 
new one or not part of one at all. As Safran notes, people of the same origin may or may 
not have diasporic identities (1991). This study, in a way similar to, though distinct from 
Van Hear (1998: 6) will propose a looser understanding of the term than many (e.g., 
Challiand and Rageau, 1995; Marienstras, 1989; Safran, 1991, see also Butler, 2001). As 
alluded to above it is proposed that migrants dispersed to at least two locations with an ongoing 
relationship with the homeland and a degree ethnonational consciousness are diaspora members. 
An explicit concern will be to eschew primordial or essentialist perspectives in favour of 
non-essentialist, more fluid understandings of ethno-nationality and therefore of 
diasporan identity. (See Winland, 1995; for a good example of such an approach see 
McKeown, 2000). Clearly attachment to home is critical for involvement of diaspora in 
post-conflict reconstruction – raising the bar too high on who should be included might 
prejudge that issue however (Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2002:205).  
 
For the purposes of analysis this study examines the political and economic aspects of 
how diaspora networks contribute to the development of a political economy of peace. In 
network analysis the world is composed of networks, not groups.  Rather than assume 
the existence of bounded groups empirically verified ‘crosscutting memberships in 
multiple social circles’ are seen as ‘weav[ing] together social systems’ (Wellman, 
1988:37). Structured social relationships, it is argued, are a more powerful source of 
sociological explanation than personal attributes of system members. Thus in the 
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beginnings of revolution in France the artisans of the Vendee ‘did not all rise up 
spontaneously as the aggregated indignation of thousands of individuals.  Rather, ties 
between local communities and occupational groups structured political activity’ (Tilly, 
1967). In peacebuilding it may be found that ties between local diaspora networks and 
local homeland communities structure their politico-economic support for rebuilding 
peace in a sustainable way. In diaspora networks constraints apply and opportunities 
arise for individuals to engage with ‘homeland’ development from the structured systems 
of social relationships in which they operate.  
 
This paper takes a new approach by examining how organised diaspora networks 
contribute to their respective homelands. The network analysis literature suggests 
networks can be either social or organised. The organised criminal networks  or the 
related forms of organised diaspora networks may assume forms and processes more akin 
to Ronfeldt and Aquilla’s notion of netwar, which they identify as ‘principally an 
organisational dynamic’ (henceforth R&A, 2002, 4; see also Milward and Raab, 2002). 
The evidence for this paper derived from primary research including structured 
interviews with diaspora organisation network leaders suggests structures maybe more 
hybrid in formation. 
 
The explosive expansion of the internet and other forms of communication since the late 
1980s have increased ‘the range and quality of diasporas’ activities’ (including the 
introduction and implementation of new technologies into the homeland) (Sheffer, 182; 
Anderson, 2000; Castells, 1996; Kazanjian and Kassabian, 1996). Many of the structured 
relationships examined in this research would hardly exist without these technological 
developments. This revolution in communicational technology and new attitudes to 
transnational activism have presaged new understandings of the politics of diaspora 
activity. It is theoretically possible now for organised diaspora networks linking millions 
of diasporans in real-time communication to establish themselves, interlinked, in 
numerous countries, to debate political issues amongst themselves, to form agendas of 
concern about the homeland and to draw up and implement plans of action across a 
range of issues affecting homeland peacebuilding and reconstruction. These networks can 
harness the talents, skills, education, imagination and resources of their members and 
channel outputs in a targeted manner to the war-torn homeland’s areas of greatest need. 
Communication can take place between diaspora leaders at different levels of the 
organisation and with individual members, within or across national boundaries. 
Diaspora contact with homeland can be with government at the highest level or with 
local community or enterprise leaders or individuals. The importance of ‘observing 
asymmetric ties between states, regions and multinational interest groups’ to explain the 
nature of social structures within these states has been stressed in studies of political 
economic development of states (Wayne, 1975; Friedmann and Wayne, 1977). Funds 
can be directed towards priority projects determined and assessed by the diaspora 
network itself with or without external assistance. Mass communicational opportunities 
exist for communication in the diaspora and the homeland simultaneously.  
 
A central issue therefore is whether collective, consciously motivated organisations can 
be more effective in assisting homeland peacebuilding and reconstruction than individual 
contributions or business enterprises. (A follow-on study will compare activities at the 
level of individuals, examining remittance, investment in housing, investment, tourism 
etc in the same case studies.) Below the organised networks of the three diasporas are 
compared both to each other and to the theoretical ideal sketched out above. 
 
The three diaspora networks: comparing organisation 
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All three of the case study nationalities have diaspora organisations and thus have 
nascent or well-established formal social networks alongside the inevitable informal 
social links that exist in every diaspora. Below I examine briefly the critical defining 
characteristics of diaspora: the UK network, transnational links, links to homeland, and 
diaspora ethos and consciousness of homeland.  
 
Brah rightly argues that diasporas have to be positioned in their own socio-economic, 
political and historical context (in Frost, 2002: 293). An issue of relevance here is the age 
of the diaspora. Van Hear notes that newer diasporas face issues distinct from earlier 
waves. The three diasporas examined in this paper are all relatively new migrations 
resulting from recent wars of varying duration. The Afghan diaspora is the oldest 
migration from the longest running of the wars. The Afghan conflict (or series of 
conflicts) dates from resistance to the Soviet invasion in 1979; the conflict in Sierra Leone 
commenced in 1991 with the first RUF attack on the country and the war in Bosnia 
began in early 1992 after the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. That said, it 
is not difficult to encounter diaspora members from each community who settled in 
Britain before conflict-inspired migration; often the leaders of diaspora organisations 
come from earlier migrations.  
 
In terms of socio-economic situation, the majority of the migrants that make up the 
diaspora networks examined in this paper have come from poor rural backgrounds 
usually to metropolitan centres where they live in urban poverty relative to UK norms. 
From what might be perceived to be the most affluent of the war-torn societies examined 
here, Bosnian refugees (approaching 90 percent) came from rural parts of Bosnia. Many 
are also elderly and sometimes struggle to exist in a foreign society. Afghan leaders paint 
a similar picture with regard to the large majority of their organisations’ membership – 
poor, often with little education, illiterate in their own language, and like older Bosnians, 
usually have not managed, so far, to learn the language of the hostland. Sierra Leoneans 
have the advantage of speaking the hostland language as first or second tongue. Younger 
Bosnians, especially young adults who received part of their education in the UK, are 
probably the most assimilated social group and together with most Sierra Leoneans 
encountered in interviews and at social events, seem the most at home in the host 
society. As will be shown, both groups, within their respective networks, retain a strong 
interest in the improvement of their homelands. 
 
The tribal or ethnic divisions that play into the homeland politics of each of the case 
study countries inevitably will be mapped, in part at least, on to the diaspora networks at 
national and transnational levels. The nature of this mapping will be dependent to a 
significant degree upon the nature of the war or other factors that led to the migration of 
the diaspora population. For example, the overwhelming majority of refugees who fled 
afar from the war in Bosnia were Bosnians of Muslim or Bozniak ethnicity. They were 
the largest minority population, the most concentratedly-targeted group, and those 
Croats and Croat Bosnians, and Serbs and Serb Bosnians who were forcibly expelled 
during the war mostly fled to their respective homelands, Croatia and Serbia. There are 
of course significant Yugoslav diaspora populations (mainly Serbs and Croats) from an 
earlier era in the U.S., Canada, Australia and the U.K. The fact that most Bosnian 
diaspora populations are largely from Muslim/Bozniak backgrounds suggests the 
possibility of greater connectivity within the diaspora network than with the other case 
study countries. In the other two case study countries conflict was less focused, for a 
large proportion of the duration of the conflict at least, on a war against a particular 
tribal, ethnic, or national group. 
 
UK network organisation 
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Key to inquiry into organised diaspora networks is the attempt to establish to what extent 
is there collective action by diasporas. Collective action uses the skills, talents and 
resources of the many to potentially much greater effect than the efforts of scattered 
groupings and individuals. A first question must be therefore, how have diasporas in the 
UK organised themselves?  
 
In terms of organisation, the UK Bosnia Network, established in Birmingham in 1996, 
and composed of about sixty organisations including local groups scattered across the 
U.K., organisations such as the Bosnian Institute and a Jewish Bosnian group, is the 
most formally structured of the UK diaspora networks under discussion here (I-04).1 
There are a few Bosnian organisations such as the Women of Srebrenica organisation 
which have not affiliated to the network. However, the network’s leadership considers 
the organisation open to all Bosnians regardless of ethnic or religious identity and indeed 
has members from every group (Haber, Nov-Dec 2000:5; B-02). Members consider 
themselves Bosnians but at the lower identity level of ethnicity, the majority have a 
Muslim or Bozniak identity (B-02). Approximately 30 percent in London are from other 
backgrounds and lower percentages in other regions, according to diaspora leaders (B-02, 
B-03). Bosnian organisations celebrate Eid and Christmas.2  (Sierra Leonean groups 
appear similarly open in their membership criteria as do their Afghani counterparts. 
Several respondents from the latter nationality, however, voiced some concern about 
tribal and religious divisions (and occasionally prejudices) among different Afghan 
groups.) 
 
Some groups play a more active role in the Bosnian UK network than others. This is 
often related to a higher level of resources, for example the London Bosnian 
organisations in Victoria, Brent and Willesden and in Hertford, Birmingham and 
Dewsbury each have at least one professional employee charged with organising the 
group. Funding is derived from foundations and the Lottery Fund and is subject to re-
application every 2-3 years and can only be awarded twice to the same organisation. The 
role of funding in shaping organisational networks is discussed further below.3
 
The distinct feature of the Bosnian network in the UK is the formality of its structure. 
Although there are clear social ties knitting certain parts of the Bosnian network it is a 
much more formal network than its Sierra Leonean counterpart which might best be 
understood as a set of discrete organised small networks of friends, family and associates, 
though occasionally memberships overlap or there is collaboration on projects.  The 
Sierra Leonean network is typified therefore by (homeland) locality. 
 
This diaspora community is distinct from the other communities in this study through 
the strong home-town association (HA) structure that many West African diaspora 
communities adopt in exile. The war-ravaged district of Kono boasts at least two UK-
based organisations, including the Kono Development Union (KDU) and the Kono 
District Development Association  (KDDA) which recently collaborated to promote the 
twinning and partnership of the London Borough of Southwark and their home district 
(see below). Within home-town associations, which themselves put on regular fund-
raising events in aid of their home districts, there are sometimes a range of smaller 
organisations, such as ‘old-boy’ associations, for example the Yonibana Old Student 
Association (Yosa), the Harford ex-Pupils Association, and Koidu Secondary School Old 
                                                 
1 Primary research for this paper is based on anonymous structured interviews with about 40 diaspora leaders and other 
prominent diaspora-related sources. They are numbered and indexed, i.e., S-15, indicates interview no. 15 with a Sierra Leonean 
leader. 
2 A methodological issue exists over whether to include Serbian groupings which historically have been associated with 
Serbia proper but may include a small number of Serbs from Bosnia who strongly identify as Serbs as a nationality. NB: 
few of the refugees that came to Britain in 1992-95 were of Serb ethnicity or nationality (I-05). 
3 The wider Afghan diaspora (in particular in the Midlands) needs further attention in this research. 
 5
Boys Association which regularly provide considerable assistance to homeland schools. 
Consequently the Sierra Leone network lacks connectivity and is fragmented. It is less 
formally organised, links are mostly social and therefore it is much more difficult to 
delineate its limits. 
 
While there is one Bosnian group focused on a particular area (the city of Banja Luka) 
the intention is mainly to bring together a dispersed and fragmented local community in 
the UK rather than direct energies to the redevelopment of the city. (Clearly the case of 
Banja Luka is somewhat exceptional having been the site of what was largely a 
bureaucratic, relatively bloodless, expulsion of Bosnians, which apart from certain 
religious sites, left the city intact. Consequently there is no extensive reconstruction work 
to do there. Also the city lies in the Serbian-dominated ‘Republika Srpska’ where return, 
for many years, has been very difficult if not impossible for those forcibly expelled. The 
group has recently dropped the city from its title but its composition remains largely the 
same).  Afghans similarly are not organised on a regional or local basis.  
 
In part parallel to this less formal Sierra Leonean structure, there exist issue-based 
diaspora organisations – often focused on particular interests - which have a dual aim of 
assisting Sierra Leone and the diaspora community. African Community Empowerment 
promotes development of youth talent in entertainment and the setting up of awards 
schemes, mainly focused on Sierra Leone. ‘The Young Shall Grow’ aims to relieve 
poverty caused by war and offer charitable support for educational initiatives while 
WEIN – Women Empowerment and International Networking for Sierra Leone – 
supports women  through access to better educational training, health and social care. 
Inasla, the International Association of Sierra Leoneans Abroad, is an organisation with 
an ambition to connect the disparate network that currently exists. However there 
appears to be resistance within the Sierra Leonean diaspora in the UK to the leadership 
of this organisation (based apparently on claims of nepotism within its leadership). Thus 
there is no UK organised diaspora network for Sierra Leoneans. 
 
Unlike the other diaspora organisations Afghan leaders claim that approximately 80 
percent of the community here is connected in some way to the community organisations 
– indeed one west London organisation leader claims a network with links to 3,500 
people.  (Bosnian leaders claim a much lower 25 percent. Sierra Leonean leaders are less 
willing to estimate the degree of connectivity of individuals but some have suggested 20 
percent). There are several Afghan associations or societies which connect with members 
(usually several hundred families) in their locality, e.g., the Afghan Community 
Organisation of London or the Society of Afghan Residents (Midlands). These local 
networks overlap to a degree in their connectivity to Afghans with social events often 
involving members from other areas (this can be the case with Bosnians and Sierra 
Leonean social events sometimes, too). There are also Afghan organisations which focus 
more on youth (e.g., the Afghan Youth and Family Association, the Afghan Youth 
Council), relations with the UK (the Anglo-Afghan Circle), or Afghan cultural issues (the 
Afghan Academy, Afghan Arts and Culture Association).  
 
Although there is co-operation between the groups, largely initiatives are developed by 
single local networks. However in the matter of months during which interviews have 
been carried out for this research, Afghan organised networks have initiated meetings to 
establish a London-wide network of organisations. This initiative by a female leader of 
the UK’s most-established Afghan women’s network has received a mixed response and 
distinctly limited levels of commitment from other local Afghan networks. (Slightly less 
than 50 percent of groups’ leaders or representatives turned up to the first network-
building meeting last week) (A-09). Other leaders consider her not to have contributed 
enough to the London Afghan community or maintained sufficient contact with them to 
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merit the generosity of their presence. One referred to the fact that she derives from the 
same tribal grouping as President Karzai. A long standing west London organisation 
leader claimed ‘there are people who make an issue of [tribal/ethnic identity] but as far 
as I’m concerned as long as you’re from Afghanistan it doesn’t matter which faction or 
which part of the country they’re from’ (A-06). This is a sentiment echoed by other 
leaders. But in practice there is resistance to network building in the form of ethnic 
rivalry or at least perceptions of prejudice that are then reinforced. Small-minded 
ambition prevents nexus-building, too. There is evidence of personal fiefdom-building, 
with leaders ‘encroaching’ on others’ geographical territory or planning expansions into 
relatively distant territories, almost a ‘community-grab’  (e.g., a move from a south 
London leader to take over the currently locally unsupported substantial Afghan 
community of Hounslow, west of London). A leading Afghan figure in the UK admitted 
that, ‘Afghans very often are perceived to be very unfriendly towards each other and not 
want to work with each other. I can’t blame people for that, there’s a lot of tension and 
issues. But amazingly there have been no major issues in the diaspora community’(A-03). 
The question arises: how major an issue is widespread non-attendance at a potentially 
critical network-building meeting? 
 
Despite the sometimes rapidly changing terrain of diaspora networks encountered in this 
research, the Afghan network in the UK remains the least developed of the three case 
study communities in this study. Bosnians have established a functioning, active, formal 
UK network; Sierra Leoneans are attempting to form a similar organisation, so far with 
only limited success (S-04). Some Afghans have realised the importance of widening 
existing networks but there is clearly resistance to these well-intentioned efforts. (A-03; 
A-04; A-06, A-09).  
 
At the organisational level multiple-cross links exist within the Bosnian community in 
the UK for example between individual groups – no doubt facilitated by the formal 
overarching network (B-03; B-11). Sierra Leonean and Afghan local or issue-based 
networks are often aware of other networks and sometimes collaborate, but without an 
overarching structure, there is a far from complete understanding of the wider 
community, the embryonic national network, to which they belong (A-02). 
  
Apart from occasional accusations of nepotism (against Inasla) or corruption (against 
certain Afghan leaders in London) there seems to be little overt conflict between or 
within networks (S-15; A-04). Generally there is an apparently strong sense of co-
operative activity and friendly relations. 
 
What binds these networks? They provide members with advice on the difficulties of 
living in the UK, entertainment and social events, a sense of camaraderie and sometimes 
meaningful projects of assistance for the homeland (see below). Media forms have 
assisted the establishment of ties: The Bosnian network in the UK produces ‘Haber’, a 
magazine of news and information useful to the community. Most individual local 
Afghan networks produce newsletters for their memberships. There are also enterprises 
and proposals which form connections between wider, transnational diaspora and 
between them and homeland which are discussed below. 
 
Transnational links 
 
Diaspora networks have become important ‘facilitators of internal, inter-state, and 
worldwide political, cultural and economic connections’ and according to Sheffer, may 
be seen as ‘precursors of post-modern trans-state social and political systems’ (Sheffer, 
245). All three communities considered in this paper exhibit some transnational linkages 
to homeland, though they vary considerably in the extent, formality, and intensity of 
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such links and it would be difficult to attach the label ‘system’ to any of the organised 
networks studied.  
 
The Bosnian diaspora is unique in having established since 2001, a formalised 
international network. The internet has allowed the Bosnian diaspora to establish an 
organised network (The BiH World Diaspora Network) stretching to most of the 
countries where Bosnians now reside (14). Through email, a dynamic, updated website, 
and a bi-annual world network conference, communication is rapid, simple and effective. 
Smaller groups of national leaders meet with more regularity and there are 
communications between individual local groups at the transnational level, for example, 
the BH Community UK (Victoria) group has been in contact with local Scandinavian 
groups (B-03).  Arguably without the Net the network would function in a very different 
manner, without the sense of a continuous, evolving relationship within the global 
diaspora and between it and the homeland. Perhaps no functioning network would have 
even got off the ground without such ease of communication. 
 
Robin Cohen hints at the idea that transnational communities may be another form of 
transnational social movements (1998). The switch, identified by Giddens (1991, ch.7) 
from emancipatory to identity politics, ‘the shared experiences of seeking more 
meaningful forms of political participation, and the evolution of an increasingly 
globalized repertoire uniting outlooks and actions’ (1998:9) suggests a sense of 
community in the politics of existing social movements that operate on the transnational 
level. In the establishment of the Bosnian diaspora network, in particular, are we 
witnessing the development of a proto – transnational social movement? This diaspora, 
in operating on a truly transnational level, with hundreds of thousands of ‘members’ and 
hundreds of core organisers spread across over ten countries campaigning for specific 
rights for themselves and other Bosnians and against the current structural arrangements 
underpinning government and administration in their country. I explore this notion in 
greater detail in a forthcoming paper. 
 
Despite not having a formal UK network the Sierra Leonean organisation Inasla, set up 
in 2002, has commenced development of a wider international network. But there 
appears to be a similar lack of national level network organisations in other countries, 
only a fairly small number of individuals from other countries e.g., Germany, the USA, 
Australia, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Netherlands, Canada, Nigeria and The Gambia, 
have linked to Inasla (Inasla Newsletter, No.6, Jan-Feb 2003). Thus it has yet to establish 
an international network at the organisational level.  
 
The Afghan community in the UK has made initial steps towards establishing a 
European organised network, initiated by a leader of the Afghan Association of London 
(Harrow). Europe-based partners, after initial caution, have shown enthusiasm about the 
project but nothing is yet formalised (A03). As previously noted there is a sense that the 
Afghan community is less cohesive, perhaps more divided than the other groupings. That 
said there was a clear and explicit interest voiced by some leaders in developing links to 
the homeland (NGOs or businesses or government) that would assist peacebuilding and 
reconstruction (A-03; A-04; A-08; see ‘Links to homeland’ section below). 
 
There are a number of disparate media initiatives which different diaspora networks have 
undertaken or are proposing which can be seen as enhancing transnational connectivity 
and binding the global network together. Inasla and BiH World Network both have UK-
based websites from which they reach out to a wider international membership and 
audience. Both sites enable dispersed potential network members to connect in a way 
that traditional media and personal contacts do not. The BiH Studenti.com website, an 
initiative indirectly connected to the formal network (and linked on both websites), is 
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another significant Net-based enterprise which connects hundreds of students and young 
Bosnians throughout the world. The concept, established by a UK-based Banja Lukan 
former student and run by a virtual team scattered across the world, was established in 
2003 and has a website that has received over two million hits. It samples Bosnian 
diaspora opinion, provides discussion fora for diaspora youth, a news service and assists 
in fund raising for humanitarian projects for the homeland (B-11; www.bihstudenti.com). 
 
The Afghanistan Culture and Arts Association is in the process of establishing a web-
based TV station for refugees and the Afghan Academy is seeking funding for an Afghan 
diaspora satellite station that will be received in the homeland and by the diaspora (I-01). 
The aim of this project is, according to a leading member of the organisation is to give 
Afghans inside and outside ‘an objective view of what is happening… so people won’t be 
fooled by some warlords or some tribal leaders’. This leader lamented that ‘so much 
money is pouring into Afghanistan unfortunately little of that money is spent on 
[communicating] politics’ (A-05). Bosnian entrepreneurs interviewed for this study have 
purchased rights to certain Bosnian TV outputs which they plan to broadcast to the 
diaspora (B-07; B-08). Diaspora media initiatives include ‘Starz’ a new magazine ‘by 
Sierra Leoneans for Sierra Leoneans’ launched in the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone 
in 2003 simultaneously.  
 
The relationship between ethno-national diaspora and wider regional diaspora networks, 
in our case, West African, West Asian and Balkan networks will have important 
implications for the study. The UK Bosnian Network has links to the Kosovan 
community in the UK which is organising in a similar way to the Bosnian Network. 
Incidentally, during the Kosova crisis, some Bosnian groups raised money for the 
refugees and displaced (Haber, July- Aug 1999:6). Luton, Dewsbury, Nottingham, 
Coventry and other groups raised significant sums for victims of an earthquake in Turkey 
(Haber, Jan-Feb 2000:8). Sierra Leonean groups are linked to West African and African 
organisations, too. The African Diaspora Voices for Africa’s Development (ADVAD) 
has the overall aim of establishing ‘a strong partnership of African development 
organisations in the UK’ that will achieve certain objectives, among them, building 
networks with African networks in the UK to develop a united voice in order to advocate 
effectively with governments on behalf of the African diaspora and related organisations. 
Future research will examine the role wider regional linkages play in assisting or limiting 
diaspora involvement in homeland peacebuilding. 
 
Links to Homeland 
 
Much of diaspora studies literature focuses on the homeland relation. The relationship 
can sometimes be fraught. States are depicted often as taking cynical and authoritarian 
stances towards diaspora (Sheffer, 2002). Healthy diaspora-homeland relations, it can be 
assumed, might promote positive diaspora contributions to peacebuilding. But what is 
actually perceived by diaspora members to be ‘homeland’ is important. Is ‘homeland’ 
represented by one’s locality, kin or family? Or is it mainly understood as the state or 
government? Sierra Leonean leaders interviewed for this study were often cynical about 
national politics and government, preferring connection with local organisations and 
non-officials. The author encountered more than one disaffected SLPP member, 
intolerant of the pace of reconstruction and perceived corruption within ruling party 
circles, but still loyal to the party’s diaspora branch in the UK (S-05; S-06). 
 
But it becomes clear when one spends just a short amount of time with members of the 
diaspora from any of the case study countries that most have a strong connection to 
homeland through family and friends. The issue under discussion in this paper is the 
connection between organised networks and home which is important for regeneration in 
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many ways (see Renfro and Deckro, 2001). The UK Bosnian Network’s website has 
noted the decreasing numbers of Bosnians voting in elections (200,000 four years ago, 
down to 27,000 recently).  Lilija Korac, the author of an article reproduced on the site 
(first published in Oslobodjenje) suggests responsibility lies with homeland politics – 
politicians having done little to court overseas voters (www.bihdiaspora.org). But 
perhaps one of the most significant indicators of long-term commitment to homeland is 
the effort an organised network expends on sustaining and promoting its language and 
culture to its new generation of diasporans. Both Bosnian and Afghan communities have 
made considerable efforts to establish supplementary schools (usually on Saturdays) 
precisely with this aim in mind. In tune with earlier comments, the Bosnian network 
shows a greater level of organisation, including the establishment of a festival drawing 
together experience of hundreds of teachers and pupils at an annual event (Haber, July-
August 2001:30). Sierra Leonean networks do not engage in this kind of cultural 
preservation, perhaps because of funding issues and their higher degree of assimilation 
into hostland culture and society (see below).  
 
Linkage to homeland networks and organisations, and government is present in each 
diaspora but this also varies considerably between Bosnian regular contact with embassy 
officials and occasional direct communication, correspondence and meeting with 
national politicians and officials (for example, a large contingent of UK network leaders 
met with the Higher Representative, Paddy Ashdown at an event organised by the 
Bosnian Embassy in London) to those Afghan organisations and individuals remaining 
in the UK with apparently virtually no communication with officialdom and minimal 
communication with NGOs and operative business linkages.  
 
Some Sierra Leonean organised networks have had significant contact with government, 
members of the KDU and the KDDA assisted in establishing a partnership between the 
London Borough of Southwark and the district of Kono, eastern Sierra Leone. This led 
to an official delegation, including the Minister for Local Government and Community 
Development, the Rt.hon. Sidiqi Brima and the mayoress of Kono, Mrs Mary Musa, 
visiting Southwark in January 2005. There is a strong sense of commitment among the 
members of the KDU and KDDA to the home district of Kono. Members of the 
executive committees have visited Sierra Leone and there is a strong feeling of trust 
vested in Mrs Musa (e.g., S-01; S-11; S-16).  
 
Many of the local and interest-based networks from each case study country 
demonstrated a commitment to their homelands through repeated small-scale charitable 
acts and the reporting of these back to their hostland members through newsletters or 
otherwise. The UK Bosnia Network for example, worked with Edinburgh Direct Aid to 
send four convoys of aid to Kluj and Bosanski Petrovic, while one local group raised four 
figure sums for medical treatment of individuals; sponsorship of orphans or support for 
orphanages has also been a common cause (Haber, Jan/Feb 2000:22). At a social event 
(in November 2004) the UK chapter of Christ’s King College in Bo district, Sierra Leone, 
raised £2000 which will go towards developing an ICT room in the school (S-12). 
 
The relationship with homeland government, however, is not always congenial. The 
Bosnian UK diaspora magazine, Haber, reproduced certain members’ hostility towards 
individual government ministers, in particular, the SDP foreign minister of the time, 
Lagumdzija helping to exaggerate or compound minor differences. In another edition, 
the appointment of the Ambassadoress was criticised because of her previous connection 
with the foreign minister (Haber Feb-Mar 2003:23,34). Thus the network which has the 
most regularised and sustained contact with ‘official home’ quite likely, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, simultaneously may have had the most antagonistic. Sierra Leoneans, in 
local networks, have strong connections at the local level. Afghans who remain in the 
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diaspora appear to not have much contact with homeland organisations whether NGOs 
or officialdom, despite there being an Afghan ministry for the Diaspora (I-01).  
 
Reactions from the homeland to the diaspora are part of such relations nonetheless. 
Companies based in Bosnia have helped Bosnians to return and have donated money for 
this purpose. Daut Basovic a catering businessman stumped up 100,000 km (£30,000) for 
this purpose. In total such donations have exceeded two million convertible marks. 
(Haber Jan-Feb 2000). The Afghan Government, along with the IOM and hostland 
governments have focused on getting back skilled and professional Afghans to help 
economic reconstruction. In an interview with a Minister of the Government of Sierra 
Leone it was very apparent that members of the administration are grateful for diaspora 
support and initiatives but that the official perception back home is that many Sierra 
Leoneans have forgotten their homeland (S-13). 
 
In thinking about organised diaspora network-homeland relations it becomes apparent 
that connectivity is only one part of a formula that might enable a positive contribution 
from the diaspora. Another important element is the diaspora’s understanding of its 
potential role and its concern for homeland. These elements can be described as diaspora 
self-consciousness and diaspora ethos. When Haber featured an article describing the 
global Bosnian diapora’s own development and purported success on an issue of 
importance, namely the postponement of a deadline on the citizenship issue, a new level 
of self-consciousness was reached which enables diaspora members to identify 
themselves as political actors in a process which allows new forms of politics to take 
place (Haber,  Filipova,x :26). Other Bosnians, including the secretary of the UK 
network, observed themselves as ‘a very young diaspora and not very strong. The 
Croatian [diaspora] is different; people left over 50 years ago, they have been investing 
and helping since’ (B-09). 
 
 
Diaspora ethos can be defined as the attitude prevalent toward homeland as represented by 
the values and beliefs held by diaspora members or perpetuated by diaspora groups and 
organisations. Attitudes of individuals can be alienated, distanced, co-operative, or 
committed. Organisational ethos is generally considerably more affirmatory being a 
collective expression of the individual energies that led to its formation, an organised 
network being unlikely to have been formed by a collection of individuals alienated from 
home. There are significant differences in forms of diaspora ethos in relation to 
homeland.  
 
Sierra Leonean leaders and many individuals possess an apparent primary concern for 
homeland that was not present among the majority of Afghan and Bosnian interviewees. 
Apart from facilitating information and knowledge about the homeland, one of Inasla’s 
main objectives is the ‘Establishment of a Resource and Recreational Centre for Sierra 
Leoneans [and s]upporting efforts to reduce poverty in Sierra Leone’. The many Sierra 
Leonean diaspora issue/interest-focused groups, hometown organisations and ‘old-pupil’ 
associations are networks that certainly have a social entertainment element but the 
raison d’etre is to support the selected cause. 
 
The Bosnians and Afghans have exhibited commendable concern for the fate of their 
homeland, too. But there is a distinct difference of concern, and therefore of ethos, 
between these diaspora networks and their Sierra Leone counterpart. For example, a 
major and very legitimate concern of the Bosnians is the establishment of a ministry for 
the diaspora (something the Afghans, with their massive worldwide diaspora numbering 
several millions, have already). They argue that with 1.3m Bosnians still living abroad, 
they represent a substantial proportion of the total population of Bosnia (4m). This 
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network is particularly, and legitimately, concerned for the fate of the approximately 20 
percent of the Bosnian community which it represents. Many of its political demands 
concern the diaspora (see below). Indeed the first priority of world network according to 
the current president was ‘to make good links [between] us who are abroad [with the] 
aim…together  to ask the Bosnian Government to address our problems (B-02). It is fair 
to state that the fate of the homeland, while a major and prominent concern to this 
organised network, is secondary to the Network’s concern for its own diaspora members 
(‘we are looking for ways to help our diaspora and then to find ways to help our country’ 
echoed the UK network president. B-04.)  
 
As already noted, the Afghan diaspora, less organised than the Bosnian, is closer in 
organisational level to that of Sierra Leone. But again, as previously recognised, local or 
interest-based groups in the Afghan diaspora do not have the level of connection with 
homeland as the other groups cited here. It can be said therefore that the Afghan 
organisations do not create many opportunities for their members to take action in 
relation to homeland peacebuilding. That said, change of leadership can be the catalyst 
for a significant change in the direction of an organised network’s work. A large north 
London-based organised network recently appointed a new leader with considerable 
experience of reconstruction in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The co-ordinator of this group 
noted that ‘government organisations working in Afghanistan have realised lately that 
quite a lot of their projects have not been successful as they thought they would be… not 
enough research went into the projects’. Contacts established during his work in the 
homeland led to the organisation being co-opted by Cambridge academics into the 
development of more effective reconstruction projects, being what the leader of this 
network described as ‘a major contact’ for the project. The organisation, previously 
concerned primarily with supporting local Afghans in north London is now in the 
process of shifting its work to providing expert advice on projects funded by the Japanese 
Government.  The network co-ordinator believes his organisation ‘has a lot of very 
skilled people involved with it: engineers, doctors, teachers who are really willing to 
participate but [have had] no means to do so.’ He sees the Japan-Cambridge initiative as 
the beginning of long term deployment of this expertise (A-08). 
 
The primary attention of these networks is focused on the needs of Afghan refugees (from 
various waves over the last decade and beyond) who often are unable to fend well for 
themselves in the foreignness of Britain. As noted above, many are old, uneducated and 
illiterate and are not competent in English. Put simply, the homeland could never be a 
primary concern when their funding (from the Home Office, local councils and bodies 
such as New Deal for Communities) is predicated on serving the needs of this refugee 
community. The other major concern of this nationality – that has not been experienced 
by the other groups to the same degree - is the effort to stave off pressures to repatriate 
members of their community. Many professional Afghans have been ‘head-hunted’ by 
the International Organisation for Migration as part of the ‘Return of Qualified Afghans’ 
scheme by encouraging orderly and supported return of key personnel for reconstruction. 
Unlike most Bosnians, many of the more recently-arrived Afghans fear the Home Office 
knock at the door. This and the matter of proximity affects network members’ abilities to 
return home for holidays, to keep in touch, to do business etc. Unlike many Bosnians – 
now effectively with dual citizenship – they are unable to return home for the summer.  
 
This may be an important fact for productive diaspora contribution to reconstruction and 
peacebuilding in the homeland. With the threat of forced return lifted or suspended, 
diaspora members are free to visit the homeland secure in the knowledge their UK base, 
livelihood etc., is not under imminent threat. This situation may well enable the 
possibility of thoughts of a more generous nature in relation to the home country and the 
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ability to plan business ventures, charitable initiatives or laying the foundations of return 
to assist regeneration in concert with home-based organisations, official or otherwise. 
 
Funding disparities 
 
It may be the case that UK funding sources are having the perverse effect on diaspora 
networks of redirecting their focus and energy away from the homeland toward their 
own members in the UK. (UK funding also has the effect of influencing who leads a local 
network. Some of the ‘leaders’ are actually ‘professional workers’. For example, Jasmin 
Bucic of BH Community based in Victoria, London, appears to be the leading figure in 
that organisation but would have been appointed by the UK-based funding body, the 
Lottery Fund – though undoubtedly approved by the Bosnian community.) Funding is 
certainly given for that purpose and explains why Bosnian and Afghan networks 
prioritise it. Sierra Leonean groups appear to not have received the same level of 
sustained funding that both Afghan and Bosnian organisations have achieved. The 
Bosnian network, for example, received their first grant of £67,000 from the National 
Lottery fund in the summer of 1999. Inasla, the Sierra Leonean aspiring international 
network, is supported by individual members, businesses and local government grants 
and is still struggling to obtain office space for its organisation. There are currently 
approximately 10,000 Sierra Leonean, 9,000 Bosnian and 40,000 Afghan refugees 
respectively (estimates S-01; I-01; I-05). So, if correct, numbers alone do not explain the 
distribution of funding. Public awareness of the plight of particular refugees might 
explain this disparity, Sierra Leone being significantly less prominent in the media 
representation of the three conflicts. The crisis over Bosnia, however, achieved (at the 
time) unparalleled media exposure, being described then as the most saturatedly covered, 
and most analysed and discussed, war in history (Gow, 1995). It is certain that the 
Afghan and Sierra Leonean cases did not achieve anything like the exposure maintained 
in the more proximate European war. The war has been said to have affected the 
European conscience like no other (Kaldor, 1998). The reasons for these differences in 
funding may not be significantly related to matters of political communication however. 
Also the fact of Sierra Leone’s previous colonial status and the lack of language barrier 
means that even the weaker migrants from this war are better able to fend for themselves 
in the UK. 
 
How then do these advantages, limitations and handicaps affect the efforts made with 
respect to homeland peace? 
 
Diaspora peacebuilding initiatives 
 
Organised diaspora networks influence peacebuilding through their impact on homeland 
politics and economic reconstruction. Skrbis shows how diaspora can play an important 
role homeland politics in promoting nationalism in there (1997; Winland,1995). This can 
lead to support for extreme nationalism and war (Blitz, 1996). The recent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have enabled diaspora leaders to assume important positions in 
new administrations, possibly the ultimate form of political influence any diaspora can 
have. Jazayery notes that three-quarters of Hamid Karzai’s 30-strong cabinet were 
(including the president) members of the Afghan diaspora (2002:244). Iraqi formal 
politics has been dominated similarly, with diasporans filling most Governing Council 
posts and many of the Interim Government cabinet posts, it being widely perceived that 
diaspora elements played critical roles in promoting the strategy of ‘regime change’ in the 
case of Iraq. These are clear examples of the impact of diaspora leaders when there is a 
coincidence of interest between them and powerful state-actors. When diaspora networks 
operate independently their influence is less obvious but as Sheffer suggests, there is a 
growing divergence in the interests of diaspora networks and homelands and it is thought 
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that their mutual reliance will decline further (p.248). This study has found signs of such 
divergence, as noted above.  
 
In addition, the UK Bosnian Network set up a working group to examine political 
relations between Bosnia and the diaspora. They have established an extensive set of 
demands which include a ministry of the diaspora, dual citizenship rights, casting ballots 
in Bosnian embassies rather than via Sarajevo, assistance in the creation of 
supplementary schools, and ambassadorial posts for diaspora members. Most of these 
demands affect the diaspora directly whereas the desire to see laws of restitution of 
properly implemented and the growing disillusion with current constitutional 
arrangements which is transforming into a campaign to have the Dayton Accords 
renegotiated are diaspora network intrusions into Bosnian politics. The effects of such 
intrusions would be felt as strongly within the homeland, indeed more so than within the 
diaspora. The Bosnian organised network’s existence has enabled such an agenda to be 
formulated. It means such demands have much greater weight. 
 
Afghan networks in the UK might come into conflict with the Kabul government in 
opposition to its preference, in tune with hostland interests, for the return of Afghans. 
The existing security instability in much of Afghanistan sets a context for growing 
division between diaspora networks protecting members’ interests and the state which 
appears to desire the return of most Afghans. A central issue in such a dilemma concerns 
whether or not Afghan refugees, at this moment in time, can best assist reconstruction of 
their country by remaining abroad or returning home. The level of remittance of 
resources into Afghanistan is key to resolving this issue. If Afghans are providing funds 
for relatives back home (rather than the diminishing numbers remaining in Pakistan and 
Iraq) and are relatively unskilled, they may be assisting the homeland in a more tangible 
way than if they were to return to a situation with limited work-opportunities, giving up a 
livelihood in the UK.  
 
Among Sierra Leonean network leaders, some are concerned with the pace of 
reconstruction and the use or misuse of international funds by the Government but there 
is little organised debate about alternative political agendas for the homeland (S-01; S-05; 
S-06; S-15). 
 
The politics of peacebuilding has also a hostland dimension. Despite the geographical 
and political closeness of diaspora networks to the ‘centres of global decision-making in 
London, Paris, New York and Washington’ this study found little evidence of utilisation 
of the potential to ‘lobby for changes in development’ and other policy issues in relation 
to war-torn homelands (Mohan and Zack-Williams, 2002). Issues that were campaigned 
on usually concerned the diaspora themselves, such as opposition to repatriation of 
Afghans or Bosnian attempts to secure dual citizenship rights. As noted above Sierra 
Leoneans from Kono helped to promote the establishment of a partnership and twinning 
between their district and the London Borough of Southwark and in the process 
connected Westminster politicians with Sierra Leone Government representatives but 
have not directly lobbied Whitehall. In all there has not been the kind of political 
lobbying and campaigning in the hostland the experience of Israeli, Palestinian and 
Armenian diaspora might have led us to expect. One reason is that the groups under 
study here are incipient diaspora, two of which have what I have described as at best 
‘embryonic’ organised networks. They have yet to organise themselves politically in a 
way that would allow them to exert influence on decision-making processes in the 
hostland. The older diaspora networks are more established and therefore more secure 
about their place in the hostland, and are better-funded and more experienced. 
 
Economic reconstruction 
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Transformations of war economies to economies of peace require substantial shifts in 
patterns of economic activity in the medium to long term. Diaspora networks are hardly 
likely to provide the large scale re-financing and support major international financial 
institutions are able to offer. One area they can assist in is in attracting and directing 
foreign investment from hostland contacts. Bolt argues that the home government’s 
policy is key to attracting investments from a diaspora but that ‘the strength and stability 
of the state is also important to the type and amount of resources that it can attract from 
its diaspora’ (1996: 488). Two leading Bosnian entrepreneurs interviewed for this study 
Devovic and Ceric – who are leading diaspora organisers -  argue that the diaspora itself 
– numbering 1.3m - could provide massive investment funds for credible business 
ventures. A critical issue they identify is the lack of trust diasporans have in such 
investment models and in homeland institutions (B-07; B-08).  
 
Honey and Okafor note that such diaspora investment is assumed to contribute in more 
relevant and sustainable forms of development and Uduku (2002) has shown how Igbo 
diaspora networks have a unique relation to the development of their hometowns 
compared to other east African networks. The efforts of Sierra Leonean networks to 
provide funds often for local projects is instructive. The KDU, for example, raised 
substantial funds in a short period of time through social events and individual 
contributions to assist in healthcare projects in Kono district. This has led to a proposal 
from Kono district council for funds for the construction of a training centre for nurses – 
who are in short supply - for the district (the nearest alternative centre is 80 miles away). 
Diaspora members are attempting to support this latest initiative which will require 
almost £50,000 in funding. Within this diaspora network there does not appear to be a 
dependence on rich donors as reported by Sheffer (p.188) who suggests ‘small numbers of 
rich people contribute most of the money’ to diaspora organisations (about 6 percent of 
the donors contribute about 80 percent of such funds.) Trager (2001) noted that elite men 
often dominate, using remittances or other resource transfers as sources of self-
aggrandisement, though Ahmed’s study found that 40 percent of remitters were women. 
Flows can be too partisan or repeat erroneous investment decisions. Long-term 
observation of the Kono projects may reveal a similar pattern although diaspora leaders 
have been very cautious about how the money raised is spent.  
 
The ‘productive’ project, which generates revenue and creates jobs in the hometown has 
not been in evidence in the research interviews conducted so far. This might be due to the 
non-business entrepreneurial culture of organised diaspora network leaders. Those with 
business-building capability seem rarely disposed to give up large amounts of time to 
diaspora organisations. 
 
The Bosnian World Network is also active in attempting to direct foreign investment into 
the homeland. It has established a business section (called the ‘Business Club’) which 
provides information about investment in Bosnia, seeks out prospective investors in 
many of the hostlands where diaspora members are located and then lobbies government 
on behalf of prospective investors. There have also been efforts to support job creation 
projects, such as the ‘Jobs for Youth’ project organised by an Italy-based Bosnian 
network. The group is also establishing a database of diaspora businessmen and 
monitoring economic conditions in Bosnia. Although several businessmen have been 
accompanied by network leaders on fact finding trips to Bosnia, few if any deals have yet 
been signed, a fact some diasporans blame of the homeland government for dragging its 
feet on the issue and its poor marketing skills. According to the co-ordinator of the ‘club’ 
‘generally FDI is a new idea for Bosnians [there was] not much before the war, [we] 
don’t know how to deal with investors’ (B-09; I-06). 
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Another form of diaspora contribution, what has been termed ‘reverse brain drain’, is 
reported to be currently in progress. Afghan nationals are returning home ‘in droves to 
assist in the rebuilding of Afghanistan’ (Nassery, 2003), often with IOM (International 
Organisation for Migration) assistance as part of their ‘Return of Qualified Afghans’ 
program though there are many problems for returnees (Jazayery, 2002, 243-5). As 
Gundel notes, however, ‘the linkages between aid and migration-related resource 
transfers are multidimensional and that development can lead to migration and vice 
versa’ (2002:255). The existence of diaspora can assist and has historically assisted the 
expansion of ‘brain drain communities’. (Reynolds, 2002).  
 
The focus of a number of Bosnian diaspora homeland development projects has been the 
reconstruction or rebuilding of religious buildings. ‘Fund Platani’ was organised in 
1999/2000 by refugees from Trebinje mainly living in Sweden and Denmark. They 
publish a monthly magazine, ‘Izvori’ where they request donations for the fund’s work 
on three levels: i. to rebuild the Osman-Pasic mosque and other buildings in their home 
town; ii. to develop contact with the Bosnian community there and iii. assist refugees in 
their return [Haber, Jan-Feb 2000:23] Another transnational diaspora initiative was the 
campaign by various prominent diaspora members, led by among others Yale Professor, 
Ivo Banac  to rebuild the mosque and old town of Stolac [Haber, Jan-Feb 2000]. 
Similarly the Coventry group assisted in organising a seminar on re-development in 
Banja Luka, especially focused on the rebuilding of religions buildings there.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Primary research interviews conducted with organisational leaders of the three diaspora 
networks support Sheffer’s (2002) contention that networks are growing in self 
confidence and assertiveness. Overall there appears to be considerable goodwill towards 
the homeland in these UK-based diaspora organisations although much of their work is 
concerned with their UK-based members. Is the imperative of survival of a diaspora 
community in a foreign land the only reason why none of these networks cannot as yet 
be described as a significant player in homeland reconstruction? Clearly this imperative is 
felt more keenly among Afghans in the UK. Funding opportunities and concomitant 
demands have directed energies further towards this type of objective, which, in essence, 
is an assistance to the hostland. The exceptional ethos of the Sierra Leonean networks in 
relation to, in particular, local homeland organisations or causes has no correlate in the 
other diasporas. But being quintessentially local, in terms of targets for assistance and 
organisation of networks in the UK, means these well-meant, possibly well-directed, 
transfers of resources, remain small. Further detailed and long term study would be 
required to ascertain the exact aggregated extent and efficacy of such projects throughout 
Sierra Leone, but it seems improbable these, unlike informal transfers, would ever match 
IFI involvement. Another important factor, again in contradiction of Sheffer, is the lack 
of funds and assets among these diaspora leaders and their networks. There are no signs 
of rich businessmen or benefactors stepping in, if only occasionally, to provide a boost to 
the compatriot network. Many members fled their homelands and arrived in the UK with 
few assets to their name. These are thoroughly grassroot networks. In recent piloting of a 
survey questionnaire examining informal transfers to homeland to a small group of 
randomly-chosen Afghans in South London all were struggling with the basics of 
survival here and were palpably bemused by the notion of investing in Afghanistan. 
 
Finally, a major limitation must be the organisational question that has been prominent 
throughout this paper. Sierra Leonean and Afghan networks need to establish strong 
national and international networks to enable them to represent as many diasporans as 
possible. In forming such organisations they would be able to campaign for existing 
objectives and develop broader political and economic agendas for homeland 
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peacebuilding and reconstruction. It may be that this is exactly the path these networks 
will take and that this study has alighted upon an early stage of development of organised 
diaspora networks. It takes time, energy and imagination to develop such organisations, 
qualities abundantly present in all of these diaspora communities. In the longer term, 
they may well contribute significantly to homeland peacebuilding. Developments over 
the few months duration of this research in terms of a growing awareness of the 
homeland plight in all organised networks as well as the stalled network building 
attempts of Afghans suggest a dynamic social terrain on which to conduct such enquiry 
and the likelihood that there will be significant, network-building developments in future. 
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